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This article unpacks reasons why the Propaganda Model represents a 
critical sociological approach to understanding media and society, 
explores the model’s potential within the sociological field, and considers 
the trajectory of its reputational reception to date. The article also 
introduces the three central hypotheses and five operative principles of 
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(competing) approaches that explore the relationship between ideological 
and institutional power and discursive phenomena. 
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he Propaganda Model (hereafter PM) of media 
behaviour advanced by Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
is analytically and conceptually concerned to theorize the 
intersection between communicative power and political 
economy in contemporary capitalist society, specifically the 
United States (US). Academic engagement with the PM is 
typically limited to overviews of its five filters and brief 
comments devoted to its predictions regarding the role and 
function of media in contemporary society. Meanwhile, 
relatively little attention has been accorded to the multi-
plicity of ways in which the PM intersects with central 
theoretical concerns within the intellectual field of 
sociology. This article suggests that the PM is directly 
relevant to the discipline of sociology, and it begins by 
highlighting the centrality of the concept of power in 
relation to both sociology and the PM. The article then 
introduces the three central hypotheses and five operative 
principles of the PM before reviewing the nature of the 
academic engagement with the PM to date. 
      Sociology is comprised of various and often competing 
perspectives that share a common aim in striving to 
discover knowledge/‘truths’ about social phenomena and 
the social world. This article offers a sociologically 
informed history of the PM, maps out the creation and 
diffusion of its reputation as a relatively marginalized 
conceptual model, and considers how its reputation has 
been socially constructed. The relative ease with which the 
PM’s first-order predictions may be applied and tested 
empirically clearly demonstrate that the PM is centrally 
concerned to discover knowledge/truths about patterns of 
media behaviour. As noted, generally speaking, all 
sociological perspectives are inspired by the search for 
‘truths’ and are comprised of sets of elaborate arguments. 
The perceived strengths and limitations of various 
perspectives can in part be gleamed by the extent to which 
corresponding evidence suggests that the various 
hypotheses advanced are accurate and/or intuitively 
plausible and serve some utility in explaining and under-
standing recurring, empirically specifiable patterns. 
      The conception of social organization upon which the 
foundations of the PM are constructed correlate directly 
with the structural-conflict perspective within sociology. 
The PM is a structural model that confronts how the 
interrelations of state, market and ideology constrain 
democracy. It predicts that patterns of media behavior are 
connected to broader institutional and market imperatives. 
It advances numerous hypotheses, which can be tested 
empirically, utilizing the methodological techniques 
associated with the model. Toward this end, evidence 
supportive of the predictions advanced by the PM can be 
seen to lend significant legitimacy to its preferred theoretic 
and conceptual explanations regarding power and inter-
relations of state, corporate capitalism and the corporate 
media. If concerned simply with the scientific utility of the 
framework in question, the argument advanced by the 
model holds together as a general framework and has 
much utility. While the PM is highly interdisciplinary, we 
suggest here that it connects directly with the ‘sociological 
imagination.’  Exploring the PM’s potential within the socio-
logical ‘field,’ we unpack reasons why the model re-
presents a critical sociological approach to under-standing 
media and society and consider the trajectory of its 
reputational reception to date. 
      In terms of its basic underlying assumptions about the 
dialectic between ideological and communicative power 
and the structural organization of advanced capitalist 
societies, the PM unequivocally shares the general 
worldview associated with the structural-conflict or political 
economy perspective, known as conflict theory within 
mainstream sociology (see Mullen and Klaehn, 2010). The 
term refers to a theoretical perspective within sociology 
that derives from the work of Karl Marx; class conflict, 
social inequality and ideological domination are main areas 
of concern within conflict theory (see Marx, 1956). The 
term also refers to the work of neo-Marxist thinkers, most 
notably Antonio Gramsci (1971), the Frankfurt School (see 
Marcuse, 1968; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972), Althusser 
(1969, 1971) and Poulantzas (1975). Radical mass media 
criticism has long drawn upon the critical insights provided 
by conflict theory (see Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845]); 
Theobald (2006), for example, observed that: ‘Of central 
importance within a genealogy of radical mass media 
criticism is [Gramsci’s] view that current bourgeois control 
of society, while certainly manifest in material modes of 
production, is culturally embedded and naturalized in the 
minds of the people via its hegemony over discourse.’ 
Europe has long been a central hub of radical mass media 
criticism – notable figures included Raymond Williams, 
Stuart Hall and the Glasgow University Media Group – 
although internationally resonant contributions have been 
made by a wide range of scholars from around the world 
(see Carey, 1995; Parenti, 1986; Bourdieu, 1991, 1996; 
McMurtry, 1998; McChesney, 1999, 2008; Miller and 
Dinan, 2008; Giroux, 2001, 2010; Edwards and Cromwell, 
2005, 2009; Cromwell, 2006; Chomsky, 1989, 1997a, 
1997b, 1998; Herman, 1992, 1999; Herman and 
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O’Sullivan, 1990; Fairclough, 1995a, 1995b, 2002; 
Bagdikian, 1992; Pilger, 1998; Jhally, 2006; and Winter, 
1992, 1998, 2002, 2007; Alford, 2010). (See Theobald 
(2006) and Berry (2010) for a detailed discussion of the 
key figures associated with radical mass media criticism). 
In short, conflict theory is concerned with discourse 
phenomena within a multiplicity of geographical and 
temporal contexts and, like the PM, is primarily concerned 
with the question of how ideological power and material 
power intersect and reinforce one another. 
      Both conflict theory and the PM take as given that: 
power is manifest in the first instance within the economic 
realm; the existence of social classes is a primary feature 
of the structural organization of advanced capitalist 
societies; economic power enables social, political and 
ideological power; elites are the major initiators of action 
within the capitalist democracies in the sense that they 
routinely dominate decision-making processes and are 
typically motivated to exercise power in a multiplicity of 
ways according to self-interest; the structural organization 
of advanced capitalist societies and the dominant eco-
nomic or material relationships that characterize and define 
the social order directly impact the production and 
transmission of ideas; consciousness and the realm of 
ideas will correspond with dominant material relationships 
in ways that are both paradigmatic and hegemonic; and 
social control is a necessary dimension of class rule that is 
central to sustaining an unjust social order that in turn 
sustains itself by perpetuating the social inequalities upon 
which it is built.  
      Both conflict theory and the PM emphasize the 
interrelations between the state, corporate capitalism and 
the corporate media. Chomsky (1985:230) argued that the 
state comprises the ‘actual nexus of decision-making 
power … including investment and political decisions, 
setting the framework within which the public policy can be 
discussed and is determined.’ The government is 
composed of the more visible agents of power, ‘whatever 
groups happen to control the political system, one 
component of the state system, at a particular moment’ 
(Chomsky, 1985:230). Within particular time and place 
contexts, government is inherently transitory and is the 
public face of power. It may be inferred from this that 
power is manifest, made material, within dominant social 
institutions, which in turn exercise and deploy power. Ways 
in which power is deployed – materially, socially, politically 
and ideologically – vary according to specific time and 
place contexts. Highlighting the primacy of the state-
corporate-media nexus in relation to decision-making 
processes, both conflict theory and the PM theorize the 
existence of class cohesion at the elite-level (see Klaehn, 
2005a:16). That is, both recognize overlapping, mutual 
interests among elites.  
      The PM acknowledges dissent and makes no 
predications regarding the effectiveness of hegemonic 
control (see Klaehn, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a:17-18, 2005b: 
231, 2008; Mullen, 2009). Barker (2009) writes that: 
 
The conscious intent of ruling elites to 
manufacture public consent, while not monolithic 
in its effectiveness – for the most part because of 
vigorous grassroots activism – still exerts a 
massive influence on the way people think about 
domestic matters and especially foreign affairs. 
Indeed, with the massive amount of money, time, 
and technology poured into the dark art of 
engineering consent, it should not be the least bit 
surprising that corporate propaganda plays a 
central part in shaping our lives (and in 
destroying the lives of distant ‘others’). While 
elites cannot always simply manufacture public 
consent (as the public often holds vastly different 
opinions to those propagated by the media), the 
mass media has been remarkably successful at 
manufacturing the general public’s contented- 
ness and/or resignation to the idea that there is 
no alternative to capitalism – both of which do 
wonders to bolster the status quo. (At the same 
time the media have almost completely censored 
any critical discussion of their own anti-
democratic influence on democracy, and have 
neglected to examine how the funding of liberal 
foundations works to undermine the Left – neither 
of which is very surprising.) (Barker, 2009) 
 
      In specific relation to the role and function of 
mainstream mass media within advanced capitalist 
societies, both the PM and conflict theory accept as given 
that: power meets meaning within media discourses; social 
communication, popular culture, cultural politics and public 
pedagogy reflect dominant material relationships (i.e. 
existing social inequalities); political-economic elements 
influence overall patterns of media performance, encour-
aging a systematic and pervasive right-wing bias within 
media discourses that is consistent with the interests of 
power; and careful analysis of media discourses and the 
social, political and economic contexts in which these are 
produced can enable insight into the dialectic between 
ideology and power. 
 
The Propaganda Model: Three Hypotheses and Five 
Operative Principles 
 
      It is important to establish at the outset that the PM is 
concerned with media behaviour rather than media effects. 
Nevertheless, more than twenty years after its publication, 
confusion abounds on this crucial distinction and it is, 
perhaps, understandable. Consider, for example, this 
excerpt from the Preface of Manufacturing Consent: 
 
If … the powerful are able to fix the premises of 
discourse, to decide what the general populace is 
allowed to see, hear and think about, and to 
‘manage’ public opinion by regular propaganda 
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campaigns, the standard [liberal-pluralist] view of 
how the media system works is at serious odds 
with reality. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. xi) 
 
Or this, from the opening paragraph: 
 
The mass media serve as a system for com-
municating messages and symbols to the general 
populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, 
inform and inculcate individuals with the values, 
beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate 
them into the institutional structures of the larger 
society. In a world of concentrated wealth and 
major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role 
requires systematic propaganda. (Ibid. p.1)  
 
Indeed, the very title of the book, Manufacturing Consent, 
and frequent references throughout to the ‘propaganda 
system’, suggests that the PM was concerned with effects. 
Although Herman and Chomsky have attended to the 
societal function of ideology and propaganda as an 
effective means of population control elsewhere in their 
work (see Chomsky, 1989; Herman, 1999), the PM is 
solely concerned with questions of media behaviour. 
      Situated firmly within the Marxist-radical tradition of 
media studies, more specifically the political economy 
approach, the PM effectively challenges the liberal-pluralist 
view of the role of the media in a capitalist, liberal-
democratic regime such as the US – namely that it 
constitutes the ‘fourth estate’ and functions as an effective 
check on the exercise of power. Instead, Herman and 
Chomsky argue that the media all too often serves the 
interests of the economic and political elite. This does not 
require direct intervention on the part of the corporate-state 
nexus to determine media output, nor conspiracy on the 
part of the journalists and other workers within the media 
system to marginalize dissenting voices and reproduce the 
status quo. Although cases of direct intervention (by 
editors, shareholders, agents of the state, etc.) and 
conspiracy (recycling stories known to be false, smears, 
etc.) frequently occur, as revealed by Boyd-Barrett (2004) 
and Edwards and Cromwell (2009), to give just two 
examples, the PM provides a structural, political economy 
framework to account for observed media bias in favour of 
corporate and political elites’ power. Put simply, Herman 
and Chomsky (1988: xii) insist that the PM presents a ‘free 
market analysis’ of the media, ‘with the results largely the 
outcome of the working of market forces.’ 
      The PM proposes three hypotheses and is based upon 
five operative principles. The starting point of the PM is the 
existence, or not, of elite consensus. The first hypothesis 
put forward by Herman and Chomsky is that, where there 
is consensus amongst the corporate and political elite on a 
particular issue, the media tend to reflect this in their 
coverage of that issue, to the exclusion of rival viewpoints. 
Herman asserts that ‘where the elite are really concerned 
and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware 
of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by 
effective propaganda, the media will serve elite interests 
uncompromisingly’ (Herman, 1996). Conversely, Herman 
and Chomsky concede that the ‘propaganda system’ does 
not work as efficiently where there is dissensus: ‘the mass 
media are not a solid monolith on all issues. Where the 
powerful are in disagreement, there will be a certain 
diversity of tactical judgements on how to attain generally 
shared aims, reflected in media debate’ (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, p.xii). Herman acknowledges that ‘there 
are often differences within the elite which open up space 
for some debate and even occasional (but very rare) 
attacks on … the tactical means of achieving elite ends’ 
(Herman, 1996). Critically, however, the media do not stray 
from the bounds of ‘thinkable thought’: Herman and 
Chomsky reason that ‘views that challenge fundamental 
premises or suggest that the observed modes of exercise 
of state power are based on systemic factors will be 
excluded from the mass media even when elite 
controversy over tactics rages fiercely’ (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, p.xii). It should be noted that, although 
much broader in its analytical scope, the PM makes a 
similar claim to that of the indexing hypothesis of media-
state relations put forward by Hallin (1986) and Bennett 
(1990). 
      The second hypothesis advanced by Herman and 
Chomsky is that where the media function under corporate 
rather than state control, media behaviour is shaped by 
what is, in effect, a ‘guided market system’ underpinned by 
five filters – the operative principles of the PM. Herman 
and Chomsky suggest that: 
 
Money and power are able to filter out the news 
fit to print, marginalise dissent and allow the 
government and dominant private interests to get 
their message across to the public. The essential 
ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of 
news ‘filters’, fall under the following headings: 
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner 
wealth and profit orientation of the dominant 
mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary 
income source of the mass media; (3) the 
reliance of the media on information provided by 
governments, business and ‘experts’ funded and 
approved by these primary sources and agents of 
power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the 
media; and (5) ‘anti-communism’ as a national 
religion and control mechanism. These elements 
interact with and reinforce one another. The raw 
material of news must pass through successive 
filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to 
print. They fix the premise of discourse and 
interpretation, and the definitions of what is 
newsworthy in the first place. (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, p.2) 
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      The data presented by Herman and Chomsky in 
support of the PM consisted of a series of case studies 
based upon content analysis of newspaper coverage. 
These include studies of the coverage of the murdered 
Polish priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, and other religious victims 
in Latin America; elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua; the ‘KGB-Bulgarian plot’ to kill the Pope; and 
the wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The 2002 
edition of Manufacturing Consent expanded the studies to 
include mainstream media usage of the term ‘genocide’ to 
describe events in East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo and Turkey; 
plus the coverage of elections in Cambodia, Kenya, 
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Herman 
and Chomsky also claimed that, in addition to foreign 
policy matters, the PM could be applied to domestic policy 
issues such as the North American Free Trade Agreement; 
anti-globalization protests; the longstanding elite assault on 
the labour movement; and the chemical industry and its 
regulation. In all of these cases, Herman and Chomsky 
found, media coverage reflected, rather than challenged, 
elite interests. 
      Since its publication, many critical scholars have 
presented evidence which supports the PM (see Herman, 
1982, 1985, 1992; Parenti, 1986; Herman and O’Sullivan, 
1989, 1991; Aronson, 1990; Lee and Solomon, 1990; 
Chomsky, 1991; Winter, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2007; Gunn, 
1994; McMurtry, 1998; Hammond and Herman, 2000; 
Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Herring and Robinson, 
2003b; Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Babe, 2005; Winter and 
Klaehn, 2005; Phillips, 2007; Alford, 2010; Broudy, 2009). 
Furthermore, although they did not utilize the PM, a 
number of other scholars in Europe and North America 
concurred that the media tended to manufacture consent 
for elite preferences, both in terms of domestic and foreign 
policy issues (see Miliband, 1969; Domhoff, 1979; Curtis, 
1984; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Hallin, 
1986; Hollingsworth, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Entman, 1991; 
Philo and McLaughlin, 1993; Carruthers, 1995; Zaller and 
Chui, 1996; Lashmar and Oliver, 1998; Mermin, 1999; 
Greenslade, 2003; Knightley, 2003; Miller, 2004; Altheide, 
2006; Anderson, 2006; Sussman, 2010). 
      The third hypothesis proffered by Herman and 
Chomsky relates to the way in which the PM would be 
received: 
 
[It] makes predictions at various levels. There are 
first-order predictions about how the media 
function. The model also makes second-order 
predictions about how media performance will be 
discussed and evaluated. … The general 
prediction, at each level, is that what enters the 
mainstream will support the needs of established 
power. (Chomsky, 1989, p.153) 
 
More specifically, 
 
One prediction of the model is that it will be 
effectively excluded from discussion. …However 
well-confirmed the model may be … it is in-
admissible, and … should remain outside the 
spectrum of debate over the media. …Plainly it is 
either valid or invalid. If invalid, it may be 
dismissed; if valid it will be dismissed (emphasis 
in original) (Ibid. p.11) 
 
‘The first-order prediction of the Propaganda Model’, that 
media behaviour conforms to and reflects the interests of 
the economic and political elite (where the elite is united), 
is ‘systematically confirmed’, Chomsky (Ibid. p.145) 
declared – manifest in the overwhelmingly supportive 
evidence discussed above.  
      In terms of the second-order prediction, that the PM 
would be ignored by the media and within academia, the 
evidence is again compelling. There have been only a few 
mentions of Manufacturing Consent and/or the PM in the 
European and North American media. In Britain, for 
example, MediaLens (2004) reported that, since 1988, the 
PM had been mentioned only once in The Guardian – 
Britain’s most liberal broadsheet – while a Lexis-Nexis 
database search found just ten mentions in other British 
newspapers during this period.  
      Their work has also been marginalized within aca-
demia. Paradoxically, although Chomsky was described in 
a New York Times book review as ‘arguably the most 
important intellectual alive’ (Robinson, 1979) and although 
he is one of the most cited scholars (see Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology News Office, 1992; Times Higher 
Education, 2009), Chomsky is generally ignored within the 
social sciences. More accurately, while his linguistic work 
receives critical acclaim, the disciplines of economics, 
history, media and communication studies, politics and 
sociology do not, generally speaking, engage with his 
prodigious output in these areas. The same is true of 
Herman, the main architect of the PM. As Chomsky himself 
complained 
 
…we’ve studied a great number of cases, from 
every methodological point of view that we’ve 
been able to think of – and they all support the 
Propaganda Model. And by now there are 
thousands of pages of similar material confirming 
the thesis in books and articles by other people 
too – in fact, I would hazard a guess that the 
Propaganda Model is one of the best-confirmed 
theses in the social sciences. There has been no 
serious counter-discussion of it at all, actually, 
that I’m aware of. (Chomsky in Mitchell and 
Schoeffel, 2002:18) 
 
This bold claim has been substantiated; Mullen (2010a), 
for example, surveyed 3,053 articles from ten media and 
communication journals published in Europe and North 
America (including the Canadian Journal of Commu-
? 
? 
? 
?_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
????         10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010  ISSN 1883-5953 
 
-14- 
nication) over the 1988 to 2007 period to ascertain if and 
how the PM was included in this scholarship. Of this 
sample, only 79 articles (representing 2.6 per cent of the 
total) attended to the PM. Importantly, rather than 
engaging with the PM, most of these articles merely 
included a reference to Manufacturing Consent in their 
bibliographies. Likewise, out of 48 media and com-
munication texts – typically used on British under-graduate 
and postgraduate media and communication courses – 
surveyed during the 1990 to 2007 period, only 11 
(representing 22.9 per cent) actually engaged with the PM 
(usually a few lines or paragraphs) and, of these, only four 
texts contained an extensive discussion. The vast majority 
either ignored the PM (43.8 per cent) or merely included 
Manufacturing Consent in their bibliographies (33.3 per 
cent) (Ibid.).  
      A further manifestation of their exclusion from 
mainstream scholarship is the fact that, since the 
publication of Manufacturing Consent and despite the 
significance of the PM, there have been only three 
conferences dedicated to discussing and critiquing their 
work in this field. These included the ‘Distorting 
Democracy’ conference in London (Britain) in February 
2004; the ‘20 Years of Propaganda’ conference at the 
University of Windsor (Canada) in May 2007; and the 
‘Twenty Years of Propaganda’ conference at the University 
of Northumbria in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Britain) in 
December 2009. With the exception of the Canadian 
conference, these events were not that well attended. 
 
Engagement with the Propaganda Model 
 
      Despite this general neglect, several commentators 
and scholars have attended to the PM and its relative 
merits (see Mullen, 2010b). This discourse reveals some 
disturbing truths about the nature of the dominant 
intellectual culture. The discourse can be divided into two 
distinct phases: the first wave of criticism – in the late 
1980s, following the book’s publication, and in the 1990s – 
was marked by hostility, indifference and/or an outright 
dismissal of the PM and its findings, while the second 
wave of criticism, from the early 2000s, witnessed a 
greater engagement with the PM which resulted in a 
number of important debates. Furthermore, these 
interventions can be categorized: some of these critiques 
were motivated by ideological opposition to the PM (often 
accompanied by vilification of Chomsky himself), some 
objected to the methodology of the PM, while others 
criticized the scope of the PM (its over-generalizations or, 
conversely, its failure to theorize media behaviour and 
media effects at the macro and micro-level). 
      During the first wave of criticism of the PM many 
commentators and scholars, on both the political liberal-left 
end of the spectrum and on the political right, generally 
dismissed the PM. In their book reviews of Manufacturing 
Consent and cursory discussions of the PM, these writers 
charged that the PM overstated the power of the 
‘propaganda system’ and downplayed popular opposition 
to elite preferences (LeFeber, 1988); presented a 
‘conspiratorial’ view of the media (Lemann, 1989; Entman, 
1990a, 1990b; Nelson, 1990); constituted a blunt 
instrument for analysis (Schudson, 1989); was ‘political’ 
(Salmon, 1989); was deterministic, functionalist and 
simplistic (Schlesinger, 1989, 1992; Golding and Murdock, 
1991; Eldridge, 1993); and neglected the impact of 
journalistic professionalism (Goodwin, 1994; Hallin, 1994). 
      During the second wave of criticism, there was much 
greater engagement with the PM and a number of more 
substantial arguments were advanced. Focusing upon the 
methodology and findings of the PM, these criticisms 
resulted in a number of debates. The first exchange took 
place between John Corner and Jeffery Klaehn in the 
European Journal of Communication in 2002 and 2003. 
Having rejected many of the early criticisms levelled at the 
PM – its ‘conspiratorial’ view of the media, determinism 
and functionalism, similarity to the gate-keeper model, 
neglect of journalistic professionalism, failure to theorize 
media effects, and assumption of unified ruling class 
interests, Klaehn (2002a) restated the case for the PM, 
focusing upon the five filters and its methodological 
approach.  
      In response, Corner (2003) doubted whether the PM, 
devised to explain the performance of the media in the US, 
‘could be applied in countries with very different media 
systems and political structures’ (Ibid. p.367). Corner 
questioned what new theoretical insight the PM could bring 
to European media research and complained that the PM’s 
five filters were ‘assumed to function without much, if any, 
need for further specification or qualification’ and resulted 
in a ‘totalizing and finalizing view’ of media performance 
(Ibid. p.369). Corner also critiqued the notion of a ‘filter’ 
and asked whether the filtering process itself produced the 
resulting media messages or merely served to modify what 
has already been produced. Corner charged that 
proponents of the PM ignored the long-standing European 
media research tradition, rooted in critical-Marxist 
analyses, on media-state-market relations. In short, these 
proponents do not situate the PM within this tradition, nor 
acknowledge the antecedents upon which the PM is 
founded. Corner questioned whether the PM supported or 
rejected liberal principles (such as journalistic pro-
fessionalism); whether media workers involved in the 
propaganda system were conscious of its operation and 
effects; and whether, by deploying notions such as 
‘brainwashing under freedom’ and ‘thought control’, the PM 
was indeed concerned with media effects rather than just 
media behaviour.  
      In a 2003 article published in Journalism Studies, 
Klaehn (2003a) explored criticisms that had been made of 
the PM by both academics and commentators. He 
exploded the myth that the model is conspiratorial, that it is 
deterministic, that it fails to account for micro-processes of 
media behaviour (which the structuralist PM never set out 
? 
? 
? 
?_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
????         10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010  ISSN 1883-5953 
 
-15- 
to do), and that it fails to theorise audience effects (which 
was never the intention of the PM). 
      In a further response, Klaehn (2003b) re-emphasized 
the attractiveness of the PM from a social science 
perspective, specifically the ease with which its predictions 
could be empirically tested. Unlike Corner, who 
characterized the PM as ‘closed’, Klaehn argued that the 
operation of the five filters was contingent and variable; the 
PM was thus relatively flexible and ‘open’. Klaehn criticized 
Corner for not having recognized the limitations of the PM, 
acknowledged by its creators, and stated that the PM did 
not seek to explain all aspects of media performance. 
Instead of rejecting the PM from a conceptual-theoretical 
perspective, Klaehn encouraged scholars to test the 
hypotheses that Herman and Chomsky put forward. 
      In a special issue of the Review of International Studies 
in 2003 (Volume 29), a number of scholars debated the 
significance of Chomsky’s work within the field of 
international relations. Herring and Robinson (2003a, 
p.551) stated that  
 
Once we started to read Chomsky’s work, we 
concluded that there was a great deal to be 
learned from it. However, when we began to 
draw on it, we came up against widespread 
hostility towards his work combined with both 
ignorance and misrepresentation of what he 
writes.  
 
In a further article, Herring and Robinson (2003b) observed 
that the work of Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990) – who 
advanced an indexing hypothesis regarding media-state 
relations – shared the same analytical framework as 
Herman and Chomsky. Nevertheless, an examination of 
eight major studies on the media and US foreign policy 
found that ‘they only cite Hallin and/or Bennett, but not 
Herman and Chomsky, despite offering arguments and 
conclusions that overlap heavily with those of Herman and 
Chomsky’ (Herring and Robinson, 2003b:558). In seeking 
to explain this marginalization, Herring and Robinson 
dismissed the personalized explanation – Chomsky’s 
apparent ‘polemical’ style – and offered instead an 
institutional explanation: the operation of the flak filter, 
which discouraged anti-elite analyses and perspectives, 
given that universities are part of the corporate-state 
nexus. 
      Boyd-Barrett (2004:436), who accepted the basic 
premises of the PM, complained that the PM did not 
‘identify methodologies for determining the relative weight 
of independent filters in different contexts’; lamented the 
‘lack of precision in the characterization of some of the 
filters’ in the PM; bemoaned the fact that the PM privileged 
structural factors and ‘eschews or marginalizes 
intentionality’; and called for the revision of the PM along 
these lines. More specifically, in terms of sourcing and flak, 
Boyd-Barrett recommended greater attention to journalistic 
departures from, rather than routine conformity with, the 
preferences of official sources, and further study of 
journalistic fears of flak from editors, the right-wing media 
and government officials. Boyd-Barrett also suggested a 
sixth filter: the ‘buying out’ of individual journalists or their 
media by intelligence agencies, other government bodies 
and/or special interest groups. Disputing Chomsky’s 
stance on ‘conspiracy theory’, Boyd-Barrett pointed to the 
1970s US Senate investigations and the ‘irrefutable 
evidence of wide-scale, covert CIA penetration of media – 
by definition, an illustration of ‘conspiracy’ at work’ (Ibid. 
p.436). 
      The second exchange on the PM took place between 
Kurt and Gladys Lang and Herman and Chomsky in the 
Political Communication journal in 2004. Lang and Lang 
(2004a) challenged the theoretical adequacy of the PM 
and questioned whether it approximated how the media 
functioned. The Langs advanced a number of criticisms. 
They suggested that Herman and Chomsky were seeking 
to make a political point in presenting their empirical data. 
They also argued that Herman and Chomsky neglected to 
provide information about their sampling and coding 
procedures and they doubted the ‘the viability of a model 
about ‘the media’ in general based on anecdotal evidence’ 
(Lang and Lang, 2004a:95). They challenged Herman and 
Chomsky’s use of the term ‘genocide’ in their 2002 edition 
of Manufacturing Consent. They complained that Herman 
and Chomsky did not inquire how events became news 
and charged that they assumed that information existed 
but had been screened out of the media production 
system. They acknowledged that the media production 
process was routinized, pointing to the symbiotic 
relationship between producers (sources) and conveyors 
(editors and journalists), but argued that such relations 
frequently became adversarial when interests diverged. 
Furthermore, media owners often took risks and put out 
material that politicians wished they had not. In short, there 
was much interaction, both collaborative and 
confrontational, between conveyors and sources. The 
Langs argued that the media have an important 
informational role and journalists have professional norms; 
these help to prevent the media becoming a mere 
mouthpiece for elite interests. They declared that the 
media do provide space for alternative points of view, 
particularly where there are divisions within the elite and 
where there are significant (oppositional) political 
movements. Concurrently, the Langs suggested that to talk 
of a ‘propaganda system’ evaded the fact that Chomsky 
can and does get his ‘deviant point of view’ (Ibid. p.97) into 
the public domain through the very media he criticizes.  
      When it comes to coverage of events outside the US, 
the Langs suggested there are cultural, institutional and 
linguistic constraints that increased ‘the dependence of 
journalists on embassy personnel and on other experts, 
many of whom have connections, past or present, to the 
government.’ However, they argued that these constraints, 
which are consistent with the PM, are ‘less limiting when it 
comes to covering events at home’ (Ibid.). They argued 
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that the media are themselves active players in elite 
conflicts and some of these struggles involve criticisms of 
media performance. They pointed out that the media do 
scrutinize corporate scandals and the failures and 
misdeeds of the US and its allies. Also, the Langs argued 
that Chomsky misquoted the work of Walter Lippman and 
others concerning the role of propaganda in society. 
      In their reply to the Langs, Herman and Chomsky 
(2004a) raised a number of concerns. First, they com-
plained about the Langs unjustifiably conflating the PM 
with Chomsky’s political views. Second, they declared that 
the sampling and coding procedures were clear and that 
the empirical data could be checked; it was not anecdotal. 
Third, they defended their use of the term ‘genocide’ and 
accused the Langs of political bias in raising this point – 
consistent with media’s own bias about ‘worthy’ and 
‘unworthy’ victims. Fourth, they argued that they had tested 
the PM using a range of cases that were important in 
themselves and that received prominent media coverage. 
They did not seek out promising cases. Fifth, in response 
to the Langs’ claim that they did not focus on the media 
production process, they argued that 
 
Since we focus on how the available evidence 
was selected and interpreted, we were very 
definitely concerned with how newsworthy facts 
are located, who the media rely on as sources, 
how critically they treat them, what forces 
determine what is newsworthy in the first place – 
and how stories are inflated, repeated or 
dropped, and how politically convenient fab-
rications may survive and even become 
institutionalized. Our model deals with these 
matters explicitly in describing sourcing pro-
cesses, flak, ideology and other matters. But we 
put our main emphasis on the empirical results of 
media selection processes, which are crucial 
facts about the media. (Ibid. p.105)    
 
In short, theirs is a macro- rather than micro-level analysis 
of the media production process. Sixth, they charged that 
the Langs offered no explanation to account for the 
radically different treatment of ‘worthy’ and unworthy’ 
victims by the media. Seventh, Chomsky defended his 
interpretation and use of the work of Lippmann and others. 
      In response to Herman and Chomsky, Lang and Lang 
(2004b) argued that the media production process was a 
negotiated product, a social construction, and not one that 
is controlled by the government or any one party. They 
again questioned the empirical data presented by Herman 
and Chomsky and they again challenged the use of the 
term ‘genocide’. Herman and Chomsky (2004b), in turn, 
responded to these points and rectified the mistakes made 
by the Langs. 
      The third exchange on the PM took place between 
Robert Barsky and Gabriel Noah Brahm in the Critical 
Studies in Media Communication journal in 2006. Where 
Barsky (2006) celebrated Chomsky’s radicalism and traced 
its impact upon Chomsky’s work, Noah Brahm (2006) 
dismissed him and argued that Chomsky typified a 
‘dangerous’ intellectual trend – authoritarian, narcissistic 
and obsessive – governed by ‘an uptight psychology’ (Ibid. 
p.454). In terms of the PM, Noah Brahm complained that 
Herman and Chomsky had ignored the insights generated 
by cultural studies (for example Barthes on semiotics, 
Marcuse on ideology and Foucault on discourse) over the 
last twenty years. However, as with the output during the 
earlier phase of criticism, Noan Brahm did not engage with 
the substance of the PM.  
      Sparks (2007), who, like Boyd-Barrett, was also 
broadly in agreement with the PM, challenged Herman and 
Chomsky’s claims about elite consensus/dissensus, 
questioning the strategic-tactical dichotomy they posited, 
and insisted that, not only are the capitalist class frequently 
divided on account of their particularistic interests, but the 
economic and political systems of other countries are quite 
different from that of the US (on which the original PM was 
based). In Europe, for example, Sparks highlighted the 
existence of significant left-wing parties, the centrality of 
public service broadcasters, the reality of sizeable working 
class electorates, and the impact of competitive press 
markets responding to partisan and socially stratified 
polities. As a consequence of these, Sparks argued that 
‘we would expect to find … a much wider and far-ranging 
set of arguments in the media than simply in-house 
disputes between different wings of the capitalist class’ 
(Ibid. p.74). Sparks emphasized the need to differentiate 
between the performance and role of the elite media 
compared to the mass media; argued that source 
dependence did not guarantee journalistic compliance – as 
elite sources may be disarticulated and divided thus 
opening up the space for alternative, non-corporate and 
non-state sources; and stipulated that journalists, on 
account of their class position as wage labourers, 
sometimes resist and contest the dictates of governments, 
managers and owners. 
      With the exception of the constructive criticisms made 
by Boyd-Barrett and Sparks – and the spirited defence of 
the PM by Klaehn, Herring and Robinson, Barsky, and 
Herman and Chomsky themselves – it is fair to say that 
much of this engagement was poor and superficial; most of 
these commentators and scholars did not engage with the 
PM on its own terms, ascribing to it claims that Herman 
and Chomsky never made, and they studiously avoided 
the evidence marshalled by Herman and Chomsky, 
offering no alternative explanations to account for the 
observed performance of the media. Such blatant 
avoidance flies in the face of good social science, wherein 
scholars critique the premises and findings of each others’ 
research.  
      Misconceptions about the PM continue to enjoy wide 
currency: in textbooks, university departments, classrooms 
and on the worldwide web. Regarding the early anger and 
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hostility directed toward the PM, Herman (cited in Klaehn, 
2008) states that: 
 
The resistance and hostility to the propaganda 
model had several sources. One is that it is a 
radical critique, whose implication is that modest 
reforms that don’t alter the structure very much 
aren’t going to affect media performance very 
much. This is hard for non-radicals to swallow. 
Another source of resistance has been based on 
our relatively broad brush strokes with which we 
model a complex area. This makes it allegedly 
too mechanistic and at the same time lacking in a 
weighting of the elements in the model! But we 
don’t claim that it explains everything and we are 
clear that elite differences and local factors 
(including features of individual media insti-
tutions) can influence media outcomes. We argue 
that the model works well in many important 
cases, and we await the offering of one that is 
superior. But we also acknowledge that there 
remains lots of room for media studies that do not 
rest on the propaganda model. This same room 
opens the way to criticizing the model for its 
failure to pursue those tracks and fill those 
spaces (Herman, cited in Klaehn, 2008). 
 
Critique that deliberately avoids the whole issue of 
evidence and factual support for the PM continues to 
persist (see Corner, 2003; Klaehn, 2003a, 2003b, 2005b, 
2008), and it is extremely rare to find introductory 
textbooks within the disciplines of cultural studies, media 
and communication studies and sociology that even 
mention the PM (see, for elaboration, Mullen, 2010a). 
      Consider, for instance, how the PM is represented in 
the recently published introductory text, Popular Culture: 
Introductory Perspectives, by Marcel Danesi, the editor-in-
chief of Semiotica, for instance: 
 
One of the more interesting contemporary 
offshoots of culture industry theory is propaganda 
theory, associated primarily with the writings of 
the American linguist Noam Chomsky (b. 1928). 
The theory posits that those who control the 
funding and ownership of the media, and 
especially the government in power, determine 
how the media select and present news 
coverage. The media thus become nothing more 
than a propaganda arm of the government and 
put forward mainly its point of view (Danesi, 
2008:44).  
 
Note that no reference is made and no reference is given 
here to Manufacturing Consent – thereby leaving the 
potentially (and probably) otherwise unknowing student 
(presumably the ‘target audience’ for an introductory text 
such as this one) with no signposts by which to seek 
evidence supportive of the PM’s arguments, which are also 
seriously misrepresented within the overview presented in 
the text. It bears noting again that Edward S. Herman was 
actually the principal architect of the PM, and he is not 
mentioned at all within the overview. Concurrently, as 
explained above (also see Klaehn, 2002a, 2003a, 2003b), 
the PM argues that patterns of media performance should 
be understood as an outcome of market forces; it suggests 
that political-economic elements influence overall patterns 
of media performance. The PM is concerned to explore 
media content in relation to what’s present within media 
texts and also what’s absent, and the fact that the model is 
flexible and easily tested makes it remarkably well-suited 
for empirical research. Danesi’s claim that the PM casts 
media as ‘a propaganda arm of the government’ 
fundamentally mischaracterizes the model. Danesi’s stress 
on the ‘government in power’ is exactly the opposite of 
what Chomsky argues (outlined above) regarding the de-
marcation between the government and the state (see 
Edgley, 2009, for elaboration). Beyond this, as has been 
repeatedly noted in literature on the PM, the Herman-
Chomsky model is not deterministic. It does not argue that 
media function solely to circulate propaganda, and it is in 
fact a ‘model’ (as implied by the name given it by its 
originators) as opposed to a ‘theory.’ Danesi continues,  
 
Examples used by propaganda theorists to 
support their view include mainstream American 
television coverage of recent wars, from the 
Vietnam War to the War on Terror (in 
Afghanistan and Iraq), by which it is shown that 
the government in power has the ability to 
influence how the media present its coverage. 
 
Like Marxist scholars, propaganda theorists see 
pop culture as an industry serving those in 
power. Although people commonly believe that 
the press has an obligation to be adversarial to 
those in power, propaganda theorists argue that 
the media are actually supportive of authority, for 
the simple reason that the press is dependent on 
the powerful for subsistence ... Like the Frankfurt 
scholars, propaganda theorists do not seem to 
believe that common people can tell the 
difference between truth and manipulation. The 
solution these theorists offer is to ensure that 
access to public media is an open and 
democratic process. Such access is, in fact, 
becoming a reality because of the Internet, where 
basically anyone can post an opinion and garner 
an international audience for it, almost instan-
taneously. This very fact shows the untenability 
of propaganda theory. If consent was really 
manufactured in the populace as the theorists 
claim, why is there so much dissent against the 
war in Iraq online expressed by ordinary people?  
To my mind, individuals’ web-based political 
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critiques are evidence of the capacity of the 
masses to resist indoctrination (Danesi, 2008: 
45). 
 
And thus ends Danesi’s overview of the PM. Exactly who 
these ‘propaganda theorists’ are – it bears noting – is not 
entirely clear, as no references are included within his 
discussion. As recent research indicates, the PM has 
international resonance and scholars from Canada, the 
United States and Europe have demonstrated its 
applicability – testing the PM in terms of a wide range of 
domestic and international topics and issues (for a 
comprehensive listing of such studies, see SourceWatch, 
2010; see also Klaehn, 2009; Mullen 2010a, 2010b; Mullen 
and Klaehn, 2010). 
      It is certainly true that the PM argues, in the first 
instance, that media discourses are shaped by market 
forces. This is ‘for the simple reason’ that the ownership, 
size and profit orientation of the dominant media impact 
significantly upon the contexts in which discourses are 
conceived and produced (see Bagdikian, 1992; Lee and 
Solomon, 1990; Golding and Murdock, 1991; Murdock and 
Golding, 1977; McChesney, 1999, 2008; Klaehn, 2010).  
The PM does not assume that media are monolithic, nor 
does it ignore dissent. Chomsky has described the media 
system as inherently unstable (see Chomsky, 1997a; 
Klaehn, 2003b, 2005b:231) and the PM makes no claims 
regarding how effective media may or may not be.  
Evidence suggests, however, that the media are extremely 
effective in influencing public discourse (see Winter, 1992, 
2007; Klaehn, 2003b, 2010; Miller, 2004; Everton, 2005; 
Eglin, 2005; Jensen, 2005; Winter and Klaehn, 2005; 
Scatambulo-D’Annibale, 2005; Ginsberg, 1986; Lee and 
Solomon, 1990) and are also influential politically (see 
Winter, 2002, 2007; Sussman, 2007, 2010; Chomsky, 
1989, 1991; Herman, 1985, 1999; Herman and O’Sullivan, 
1991; McMurtry, 1989; Klaehn, 2002b, 2006b, 2006d; 
Edwards and Cromwell, 2005, 2009; Cromwell, 2006). 
Moreover, Herman (2000) has replied to suggestions that 
the Internet weakens and/or disproves the PM, stating that: 
 
Some argue that the Internet and the new 
communication technologies are breaking the 
corporate stranglehold on journalism and open-
ing an unprecedented era of interactive demo-
cratic media. There is no evidence to support this 
view as regards journalism and mass commu-
nication. In fact, one could argue that the new 
technologies are exacerbating the problem. They 
permit media firms to shrink staff even as they 
achieve greater outputs, and they make possible 
global distribution systems that reduce the 
number of media entities. Although the new 
technologies have great potential for democratic 
communication, there is little reason to expect the 
Internet to serve democratic ends if it is left to the 
market.  
 
Herman and Chomsky have more recently commented that 
the rise of the internet-age (blogging, podcasting, etc.) has 
not limited or lessened the applicability of the PM (see 
Mullen, 2009). 
      As highlighted above, the PM is often simply ignored in 
scholarly debates surrounding media performance. A 
recent special issue of the Canadian Journal of Commu-
nication, devoted to ‘Rethinking Public Relations’, 
illustrates such marginalization. Miller (2009) observed that 
the journal opens with an editorial which approvingly cites 
PR apologist Ray Hiebert’s famous claim that ‘without 
public relations, democracy could not succeed in mass 
society’ (cited in Greenberg and Knight, 2009:183). The 
editorial concludes with the declaration that ‘PR is a 
contested and contradictory domain that lacks a unified 
professional identity or theoretical framework’ (Greenberg 
and Knight, 2009:186). The PM is not mentioned. The vast 
literature devoted to radical mass media criticism is simply 
ignored, and media impact in relation to the whole issue of 
manufacturing compliance and conflict theory’s suggestion 
that the corporate-state-media nexus is directly relevant 
and crucial to study of discursive phenomena is entirely 
avoided. Such exclusion reflects and reinforces an 
intellectual culture which is steeped in ideological and 
personal bias. The journal begins with an article devoted to 
examining corporate crisis response strategy that is almost 
wholly uncritical (Greenberg and Elliot, 2009) in terms of its 
engagement with the intersection between communicative 
power and political economy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
      Alex Carey (1995:18) observed that the 20th century 
has ‘been characterized by three developments of great 
political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth 
of corporate power and the growth of corporate propa-
ganda as a means of protecting corporate power against 
democracy.’ The long-standing aim of corporate propa-
ganda, the control of the ‘public mind’ was also identified 
by Marx and Engels (1970 [1845], p.64): ‘Each new class 
which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is 
compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to 
represent its interest as the common interest of all the 
members of society.’ Accordingly, 
 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch 
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling 
material force of society, is at the same time the 
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the 
means of material production at its disposal has 
control at the same time over the means of 
mental production, so that thereby, generally 
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means 
of mental production are subject to it [emphasis 
in original] (Ibid.).  
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The objective is ruling class hegemony, where the ideology 
of the capitalist class not only justifies its power but gains 
the active consent of the oppressed in their oppression. 
The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, defined hegemony 
as:  
…an order in which a certain way of life and 
thought is dominant; in which one concept of 
reality is diffused throughout society in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, informing 
with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, 
religious and political principles, and all social 
relations, particularly in their intellectual and 
moral connotations (cited in Williams, 1960: 586). 
The corporate and political elites developed a number of 
means to achieve such hegemony. These included 
advertising and the promotion of consumerism (Packard, 
1957; Baran and Sweezy, 1969; Ewen, 1976), corporate 
control of the media, shaping the education system and the 
deployment of concerted propaganda campaigns (Mili-
band, 1973; Schmidt, 2001; Giroux, 2001, 2010; Jhally, 
2006; Jensen, 2005, 2006; Bagdikian, 1992; Herman, 
1985, 1999; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Herman and 
McChesney, 1997; Dinan and Miller, 2007; Winter, 2007; 
Miller and Dinan, 2007, 2008; Alford, 2010; Klaehn, 2010). 
The PM analytically engages with the question of how 
corporate and political power influence patterns of media 
performance, and as such is directly relevant to the 
question of how ideological power and discursive phe-
nomena may be explored sociologically, particularly within 
the theoretical traditional associated with conflict theory. 
Concurrently, the model complements other (competing) 
approaches and creates new opportunities for both 
empirical research and renewed theoretical debate con-
cerning media and society.  
      The discipline of sociology is non-dogmatic and multi-
paradigmatic and C. Wright Mills (1959:5) proclaimed that 
the great promise of sociology is that it inspires what he 
called the sociological imagination: ‘a quality of mind that 
will help [people] to use information and to develop reason 
in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in 
the world and of what may be happening within them-
selves.’ Mills believed intellectuals should embrace critical 
scholarship that engages with power and – beyond this – 
he believed that intellectuals should also strive for public 
relevance. This article has suggested that the Herman-
Chomsky PM, as a democratic and critical model that 
engages directly with how economic, social, and political 
power intersect with communicative power, represents a 
pathway for achieving these aims. 
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